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Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic ol Haiti, 376 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
The plaintiffs, two Florida corporations, brought an action against
the Republic of Haiti to recover $867,000 for. goods sold and delivered
and for services rendered to the defendant. Other damages included lost
profits in connection with the undelivered portions of the contracts set
forth in the complaint. Defendant alleged that Haiti is a foreign state
and a non-domiciliary of New York. The plaintiffs applied for and were
granted an order of attachment against the funds on deposit at the
First National City Bank of New York to the credit of Banque Nationale
de la Ripublique d'Haiti (Banque) upon an allegation that Banque was
wholly owned by, and the alter ego of, the Republic of Haiti (For an
action brought against Banque based upon the instant transactions see:
Aerotrade, Inc. v. Banque Nationale de la Ripublique D'Hait, 376
F.Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1974). The funds attached amounted
to $867,000.
The defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that it was entitled
to sovereign immunity (Tate Letter, 26 Dept. St. Bull, 1952) because
the acts of the Republic upon which the action was founded were those
concerning the armed forces (citing Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comi-
saria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Circ. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934
(1965); that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under New
York State's statute dealing with actions by non-resident corporations
(N.Y. Business Corporation Law sec. 1314); and that the court lacked
jurisdiction in that the defendant had not been served with process nor
had any of its property or assets been attached within the state, based
upon a denial that Banque was its alter ego.
Both parties submitted numerous affidavits, documents, and com-
munications relating to the contracts involved. The court ,found that
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the materials covered by the contracts included armed patrol boats, armed
helicopters, machine guns, rifles, anti-aircraft guns and ammunition.
Aerotrade attempted to show that the materials, particularly the
helicopters, were used in fashions inconsistent with the functions of the
armed forces. The court determined that the use of the aircraft for the
aid of disaster victims and the like was not dissimilar to the functions
of the armed forces of the United States during peace time. Additional
allegations concerning the use of the aircraft were found not to contradict
the fact that the contracts upon which the suit was based and the goods
sold thereunder, involved equipment for the Haitian armed forces.
The court then stated that should the contracts sued upon and the
performances thereunder fall within the categories of either public or
political acts as set forth in the Victory Transport case, Haiti would be
entitled to a grant of immunity. Further, should that fact be established,
it would become irrelevant how the equipment was used after delivery
because such inquiry would serve as an unwarranted intrusion into the
internal affairs of a foreign government (Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250 (1897).
In conclusion, the court was satisfied that the contracts at issue and
the claims sued upon concerned the armed forces of Haiti, and that the
plaintiffs failed to raise a material question of fact to defeat the sovereign
immunity defense. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed and the
order of attachment was vacated. The court did not address itself to
other issues raised by the defendant in view of its finding for the de-
fendant on the first point.
Renchard v Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F.Supp. 382 (D.C.D.C.
1974)
The action arose out of property damage allegedly suffered by the
plaintiffs as a result of' excavations carried on in close proximity to their
property by a contractor (Humphreys & Harding) employed by the
Brazilian Embassy. When plaintiffs and defendant could ndt reach an
agreement as to a settlement for repair costs, suit was filed.
Brazil moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity.
Upon denial of the motion without prejudice, the defendant sought a
suggestion of immunity from the State Department and was advised
through its ambassador that the case was not one where a suggestion of
sovereign immunity should be made.
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The defendant's motion to dismiss raised the issue whether the State
Department's refusal to suggest immunity was conclusive and whether
the court, notwithstanding such refusal, may still grant immunity.
In finding that the State Department's pronouncement was binding,
the court made note of the reluctance on the part of the judiciary to
controvert a definite determination of the State Department due to the
separation of powers doctrine. The court, taking cognizance of the fact
'that it is the executive's constitutional role to function as the nation's
primary organ of foreign policy, stated that it was ill-equipped to de-
termine the propriety 'of the State Department's recommendation since
it was basimily a foreign policy decision.
Turning to the court's ability to grant immunity irrespective of the
recommendation, it was held that since the refusal to grant immunity
was viewed as binding, the purpose behind immunity vanished and the
court need not grant it. This holding is based on the fact that the court's
recognition of a claim of immunity not sanctioned by the political depart-
ment of the government could, at best, create a politically embarrassing
situation, avoidance of such situations being the primary reason for the
invocation of sovereign immunity in the first place.
Lastly, the court rejected the defendant's' contention that the Tate
letter should be construed by the court as a basis for granting immunity
contrary to the State Department's suggestion, stating that the court
would look to the Tate letter only when the State Department chose to
remain silent with respect to a particular case.
Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 296 So.2d 498 Fla. 3d. Dist. 1974)
The appellees (plaintiffs below) were victims of a beating which
occurred in the appellant's (defendant below) VIP room at Miami
International Airport. By evidence elicited at trial, it was shown that
the assailants were hired by agents of Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. to commit
an assault and battery upon the appellees in order to discourage their
activities on behalf of a labor union. The appellees brought suit and the
jury returned a verdict in their favor, resulting in awards of $2,500
compensatory damages and $110,000 punitive damages to each of them.
The defendant appealed.
Lan.Chile's first point on appeal presented the question as to whether
or not the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a bar to recovery. Addi-
tional points on appeal were directed to the admissibility of certain
statements and the excessiveness of the awards.
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With respect to the sovereign immunity question, it had been shown
at trial that Lan.Chile Airlines was owned by the Chilean State, but
run as an independent business in the U.S. In light of this fact, the court
held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not operate as a bar to
a cause of action arising out of a purely commercial operation by a
foreign government in the U.S. (citing Harris and Company Advertising,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla.2d Dist. 1961), where it
was held that where the defendant government was engaged in commer-
cial activity and was not performing a governmental function, it could
not invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity in an assumpsit action
brought against it.)
As to the other issues, the court found that the statements were
admissible and that the awards of punitive damages were excessive.
Castro-Guerrero v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 503 F.2d 964
(5th Cir. 1974).
The sole issue raised on this appeal was whether the appellant,
Castro-Guerrero, was entitled to the automatic relief from deportation
granted by 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(f), 241(f) (1970), to the spouse, parent,
or child of a U.S. citizen.
Castro-Guerrero was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent
alien in 1956. He married another resident alien and they had children
born in the U.S. in 1962 and 1970. In March 1971, appellant was re-
turning from a trip to Mexico and procured entry into the U.S. with
an invalid Alien Registration Receipt Card. He was ordered to show
cause why he shouldn't be deported for not having possession of a valid
entry document. He was subsequently deported in April 1973.
The appellant sought relief under Sec. 241 (f) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, which excepts from deportation aliens who entered
by fraud or misrepresentation, but were "otherwise admissible at the
time of entry" and now are the spouse, parent, or child' of a U.S.
citizen. The court rejected the contention of the INS that Castro-Guerrero
was not "otherwise admissible" because he circumvented the visa issuance
and inspection process through his illegal entry, and remanded the
case for a hearing before the Board of Immigration Appeals to determine
whether at the time of his entry, the appellant met the physical, mental,
and moral standards for admission as set out in 8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1182.
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TrujiUo-Herndndez v. Farrell, 503 F.2d 954 (5th. Cir. 1974).
This was a consolidated appeal in which appellant. Trujillo-Hernin-
dez, acting in the capacity of both an affected individual and as a class
representative brought action in the court below. The appellant challenged
the English language requirement of the naturalization statute, 8 U.S.C.
Sec. 1423(1), along with its associated regulations. At trial below his
petition for naturalization was denied and the class action was dismissed.
The court viewed the case as turning on either of two points: (1)
the right-privilege distinction as it concerns naturalization, and (2) the
nonjusticiability of a direct attack on the congressional exercise of the
naturalization power.
With respect to the first issue, the court held that although aliens
are entitled to due process protection, Congress has broad authority in
setting requirements for naturalization. Further, Congress may grant or
withhold the privilege of naturalization upon any grounds or without any
reason, as it sees fit. The court citing numerous cases, pointed out that
the opportunity to become a citizen of the U.S. is a privilege and not a
right-the Constitution does not confer upon aliens the right to natural-
ization.
As to the second point, the court in light of the foreign relations
responsibilities of the Congress set out in Art. 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution, held that the question for decision was nonjusticiable on
the basis that there were no judicially manageable standards for review-
ing the foreign relations functions carried on by the other branches of
the government. The court noted, however, that the holding of non-
justiciability applied only.to the power of congress to establish conditions
precedent for naturalization.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed.
Saxbe v. Bustos, 95 S.Ct. 272 (1974).
The respondents, a group of farm workers and a collective bargain-
ing agent for farm workers, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect
to the practice of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
granting special treatment to those aliens who commute to work in the
U.S. from Mexico and Canada, on a daily or seasonal basis. The court
granted the petitioner's (defendant below) motion for summary judgment
and the respondents (plaintiffs below) appealed. The case was remanded
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (156
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U.S. App. D.C. 304, 481 F.2d 479) and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari in light of the conflict between the decision of the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals in the case below and the Ninth Circuit in Gooch v.
Clark, 433 F.2d 74 (1970).
The practice complained against is that whereby the INS classifies
the daily and seasonal commuters as immigrants "lawfully admitted for
permanent residence" who are "returning from a temporary visit abroad."
This is one category of "special immigrant" as defined by the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101 (a) (27) (B). By procuring
such a classification, an immigrant who is otherwise admissible may be
readmitted to the U.S. by the Attorney General in his discretion without
being required to obtain a passport, immigrant visa, reentry permit or
other documentation. Additionally, this class of immigrant is also excluded
from the labor certification requirements in 8 U.S.C. sc. 1182(a) (14)
which provides in part:
"Aliens seeking to enter the U.S., for the purpose of performing
skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has de-
termined and certified to the Secretary of State and to the Attorney
General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the U.S. who
are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time of the applica-
tion for a visa and admission to the U.S. and at the place to which
the alien is destined to perform such skilled or unskilled labor,
and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect
the wages and working conditions of the workers in the U.S. similarly
employed."
Mr. Justice Douglas, in delivering the opinion of the court, defined
the salient issue as whether the practice, on the facts of the case, con-
formed with the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court viewed
the resolution of the issue as turning upon the meaning of 8 U.S.C. sec.
1101(a) (27) (B), in the light of the legislative history and administrative
construction of the statute.
The respondents relied heavily upon 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a) (15) (H)
which provides that one category of alien non-immigrant is "an alien
having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of
abandoning .. . (ii) who is coming temporarily to the U.S. to perform
temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons capable of perform.
ing such service or labor cannot be found in this country." They con-
tended that the commuters maintained a residence in a foreign country
which they had no intention of abandoning.
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. In response, the court pointed out that while this position was correct
in relation to residence, the commuters only partially met the statutory,
requirements in that they did not show that unemployed people capable
of performing the labor or services could not be found in this country.
As a result, the presumption in the Act that an alien is an immigrant
until or unless he proves he is a nonimmigrant, was not overcome.
Turning to the meaning to be given to 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a) (27) (B),
the court noted that sec. 1101(a) (20) defined "lawfully admitted for
permanent residence" as "the status of having been lawfully accorded the
privilege of residing permanently in the U.S. as an immigrant in ac-
cordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed"
(emphasis added by the court). The court held that this status or privilege
did not have to be reduced to permanent residence so long as the in-
dividual's status had not changed. It was indicated that there was nothing
in the Act to declare or suggest that such status would be denied if
he did not intend to permanently reside here.
Secondly, the court agreed with the finding in the Gooch case that
the commuters could be viewed as "returning from a temporary visit
abroad" (433 F.2d, at 79-81, 82 n.1). In support of this finding the
court stated that such a position was reflective of administrative practices
dating back at least to 1927, and that such long standing administrative
construction was entitled to great weight, particularly when Congress had
revisited the Act and had left the practice untouched.
Lastly, the court found no difference in the treatment of daily
commuters and seasonal commuters because identical statutory language
covered each status.
The court concluded that alien commuters were immigrants, that
they were lawfully admitted for permanent residence, that they were
"returning from a temporary visit abroad" when they entered the U.S.,
and that the above classification was applicable to both daily and seasonal
commuters.
Mr. Justice White joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
man dissented, stating that administrative construction over a long period
of time is available for judicial interpretation only when statutory terms
are doubtful or ambiguous. Therefore, the court's interpretation of the
statute contravened the principle of statutory construction which does
not permit administrative practice to overcome a statute so plain in its
commands as to leave nothing for construction.
